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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -CONTINGENT

FEE CONTRACTS

-

DIVORCE ACTION

Plaintiffs, attorneys, were engaged by defendant to protect his
property interests in a pending divorce action previously commenced
by his wife. Defendant agreed to a contingent fee arrangement allowing plaintiffs ten per cent of all property secured for him, but in no
case was the fee to be less than $5,000 or more than $7,500. Plaintiffs
negotiated a property settlement but defendant refused to accept it
and permitted his wife to obtain the divorce without contest. Plaintiffs
obtained a judgment against defendant and levied execution on
property to which a third party claimant alleged ownership. From a
judgment for plaintiffs, third party claimant appealed. Held, judgment affirmed. A judgment based on a contingent fee contract whereby plaintiffs agreed to protect defendant's property interests in a
pending divorce action is valid and enforceable. Krieger v. Bulpitt,
251 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1953).
At common law and in England today, contracts between attorney
and client providing for the payment of contingent fees were not allowed in any type of action.1 This rule evolved from the theory that
a minimum of litigation was essential to a well-ordered society. 2 The
courts foresaw the danger of attorneys bringing suit where little or no
cause existed and felt that contingent fee contracts were an incentive
to the attorney to pursue the case without making a reasonable effort
to avoid litigation. 3
In this country, however, it is well-settled by the weight of authority that contingent fee agreements are valid and binding 4 provided: (1) they are not obtained by fraud, mistake, undue influence
1. Haseldine v. Hosken, [1933] 1 K.B. 831; Wiggens v. Lavy, 44 T.L.R. 721
(1928); cf. Solicitor's Act, 1932, 22 & 23 GEO. V, c. 37, 63 (1); Wild v. Simpson,
[1919] 2 K.B. 544, 550. Massachusetts is the only state to treat all contingent
fees void. Sherwin Williams Co. v. J. Mannos & Sons, Inc., 287 Mass. 304, 191
N.E. 438 (1934); Holdsworth v. Healy, 249 Mass. 436, 144 N.E. 386 (1924). In
Massachusetts, however, a contingent fee contract is champertous only if the
fee is to be paid solely from the amount recovered without personal liability
of the client. If he is personally, though contingently, liable the contract is
valid. Reed v. Chase, 283 Mass. 83, 130 N.E. 257 (1921); Blaisdell v. Ahern,
144 Mass. 393, 11 N.E. 681 (1887).
2. Radin, Contingent Fees in California,28 CALIF. L. REV. 587, 588 (1940).
See also, 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law §§ 163-67 (1936) (thoroughly annotated
with cases from every jurisdiction).

3. Ibid.
4. United States v. Call, 287 Fed. 520 (5th Cir. 1923); Neudeck v. Horvath,
244 Mich. 685, 222 N.W. 106 (1928); In re Meng, 227 N.Y. 264, 125 N.E. 508
(1919).
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or suppression of facts on the part of the attorney,5 and (2) there are
no elements in the contract which render it contrary to public policy,6
as in the case of contracts solicited by the attorney or which prohibit
the client from compromising or settling.3 The fact that contracts of
this character are often the only way by which the indigent can have
their "day in court" has influenced the acceptance of the modem
American rule.9
A well-recognized exception to this principle is found in the area
of domestic relations.10 It is generally accepted that any contract for
the payment of a fee to an attorney, conditioned upon his procuring
a divorce for his client or contingent upon the amount of alimony
obtained, is invalid. A few cases find such contracts void because
champertous," but they are more frequently held void as against public policy, since the law favors a lifetime marital status and a contingent fee contract induces an attorney to secure a divorce rather
than to attempt to effect a reconciliation.' 2 Moreover, alimony is not
assignable since it is intended to provide for the maintenance of the
former wife.13 Even when holding these contracts void and unenforceable, however, the court will award the attorney a reasonable
4
fee.'
The court in the instant case in holding that this contract was not
void as against public policy based its decision on the premise that
the contract "does not involve vitiating considerations contrary to
public policy or . . . 'promotive of divorce'."'1 5 While it is true that
property settlement agreements between husband and wife are upheld
5. Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441, 28 L. Ed. 64 (1884); Davis

v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S.W. 822 (1889); High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler,
182 N.C. 459, 109 S.E. 378 (1921); Dorr v. Camden, 55 W. Va. 226, 46 S.E. 1014
(1904).
6. Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 185 N.Y. 520, 78 N.E. 179 (1906).
7. Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273 (1927);
Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S.W. 178 (1906).
8. Davy v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 78 Ohio 256, 85 N.E. 504 (1908).
9. Gruskay v. Simenauskas, 107 Conn. 380, 140 Atl. 724, 727 (1928).
10. Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900) (agreement to pay
attorney one-third "of all amounts recovered or received" in divorce action
as wife's share of community property); Jordan v. Kittle, 88 Ind. App. 275,
150 N.E. 817 (1926) (agreement to pay attorneys if divorce should be granted
without opposition); Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886)
(solicitors to receive one-half of any alimony over $300).
11. Brindley v. Brindley, 121 Ala. 429, 25 So. 751 (1899); cf. Donaldson v.
Eaton & Estes, 136 Iowa 650, 114 N.W. 19 (1907).
12. Wilhelm v. Rush, 18 Cal. App.2d 366, 63 P.2d 1158 (1937); Opperud v.
Bussey, 172 Okla. 625, 46 P.2d 319 (1935); cases cited note 10 supra.
13. Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886).
14. McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746, 748 (1904).
15. Instant case, 251 P.2d at 675. The court seems also to have been influenced by the fact that the attorneys in the instant case were to defend rather
than prosecute the divorce action.
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even though made in contemplation of divorce,16 it seems nonetheless
erroneous to uphold agreements whereby the attorney is to procure
the property settlement upon a contingent fee basis. Public policy
favors the preservation of the marital relationship, and the contingent
fee contract would place the attorney in the position of working to
dissolve this relationship. It would seem, therefore, that the decision
in the instant case is an undesirable departure from the principle underlying the majority rule.

CORPORATIONS

-

CORPORATE POWER-

CONTRIBUTIONS TO

PHILANTHROPIC INSTITUTIONS

The plaintiff, a corporation manufacturing valves and fire hydrants,
instituted a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine its power
to contribute to Princeton University. A New Jersey statute authorized domestic corporations to make limited contributions to educational institutions. Stockholders objected that the contribution was
ultra vires and that the statute was inapplicable as the plaintiff was
incorporated prior to its passage. Held, corporate power exists to make
reasonable charitable contributions even apart from the statute. A. P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).1
The common-law rule2 is that a corporation may not contribute to
philanthropic causes unless the contribution would be "reasonably conducing to the benefit of the company."3 The early cases, by a narrow
interpretation of the rule, required that the contribution tend to produce a direct and proximate benefit, 4 but the modern majority rule
recognizes the power of a business corporation to contribute to humanitarian and welfare objects if there is an expectancy of advancing
the general business interest and welfare of the corporation.5 The requirement of corporate benefit has been liberalized so that the old
16. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943); Amspoker v. Amspoker,
99 Neb. 122, 155 N.W. 602 (1915); Dennison v. Dennison, 98 N.J. Eq. 230, 130
At. 463 (1925); Killibrew v. Killibrew, 24 Tenn. App. 24, 137 S.W.2d 953
(1939).
1. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the appeal was
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 74 Sup. Ct. 107 (U.S.
1953).
2. See Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 671, 673 (1883). There the
court said: "There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is for the
interest of those who practise it, and to that extent and in that garb (I admit
not a very philanthropic garb) charity may sit at the board, but for no other
purpose." See also Note, 3 A.L.R. 444 (1919).
3. Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 666 (1883).
4. See Vandall v. The South San Francisco Dock Co., 40 Cal. 83, 90, 91
(1870); 6A FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2938 (Perm. ed. 1950).
5. 6A FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2940 (Perm. ed. 1959); also citations collected 6A id. § 2940 n.20.
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cases no longer state the law applicable. 6 The present rule requires
that the contribution be made with an intent to benefit the corporation,7 that the benefit accrue to the corporation to a greater extent
than it does to society in general and that the benefit be substantial
though it may be indirect. 8 However, one case, at least, has upheld a
contribution by a corporation which might benefit both its competitors
and the donor more than society in general. 9
Recognizing corporate responsibility to others in addition to shareholders, many states have passed statutes authorizing contributions
by business corporations to philanthropic institutions.' 0 Most of these
restrict the class of recipients to some extent;' others limit the amount
of the contribution.' 2 In line with such state action Congress has made
corporate contributions to charity from gross income a deductible
expense.1s
The retroactive applicability of these state statutes is questionable
only in a minority of the states, since it depends upon the power reserved by the state to amend or repeal corporate charters. By the
minority view this reserved power extends no further than the contract between the state and the corporation; 14 thus a statute, similar
to the one in question, may be held to alter the contract between the
stockholders and the corporation and to be beyond the reserved power
and, therefore, inapplicable.'5 The early case of Zabriskie v. Hacken6. See Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y. Supp. 718, 720
(Sup. Ct. 1896). There it is said: "As industrial conditions change, business
methods must change with them, and acts become permissible which at an
earlier period would not have been considered to be within corporate power."
Cf. Virgil v. Virgil Practice Claiver Co., 33 Misc. 200, 202, 68 N.Y. Supp. 335,
337 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Blicken, CorporateContributionsto Charities: The Modern
Rule, 38 A.B.A.J. 999, 1001 (1952); Cousens, How Far CorporationsMay Contribute to Charity,35 VA. L. REV. 401, 423 (1949).
7. Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883).
8. Greene County Nat. Farm Loan Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank, 57 F. Supp.
783, 789 (D.C. Ky. 1944); Blicken, Corporate Contributions to Charities: The
Modern Rule, 38 A.B.A.J. 999, 1060 (1952).
9. Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., Ltd., [1921] 1 Ch. 359 (1920). The validity of this case has been questioned. Cousens, How Far Corporations May
Contribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REv. 401, 423 (1949).
10. For statutory citations see Blicken, Corporate Contributions to Charities:
The Modern Rule, 38 A.B.A.J. 999, app. at 1061 (1952).
11. "[F]or the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes.... ." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-112 (Supp. 1951).
12. "[C]ontributions in any fiscal year shall not in the aggregate exceed
one percentum (1%) of the capital and surplus as of the end of the preceding
fiscal year, unless .

.

. authorized by the stockholders. ..

."

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 14:3-13.2 (Supp. 1952). Tennessee limits the contribution to earnings. TENx.
CODE ANN. § 4085 (Williams Supp. 1952).
13. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (q).
14. See Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 WEST. REs.
L. REV. 3, 18 (1949).
15. See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936) (the
statute allowed reclassification of outstanding stock). Cf. Zabriskie v. Hackensack & New York R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867) (the court refused to allow
the railroad to extend its line in spite of broad statutory authority on the
ground that the reserved power does not extend to the contract between the
corporation and its shareholders).
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sack & N.Y.R.R., 16 aligned New Jersey with those jurisdictions which
limit the reserved power of a state to making changes in the contract
between the state and the corporation. The instant case, as do other
New Jersey cases, 17 does not disavow the Zabriskie case but finds
"that where justified by the advancement of the public interest the
reserve power may be invoked to sustain later charter alterations
even though they affect contractual rights between the corporation and
its stockholders and between the stockholders inter se"18 and compares
the legislation to an exercise of the police power where private interests are required to give way to the paramount public interest.
In holding that a contribution by a business corporation to a privately supported educational institution was intra vires as a proper
exercise of implied and incidental power under common-law principles, the court in the instant case considered the important position
corporations occupy in the modern economic system and pointed out
that their continued success depends upon a sound economic and social environment which in turn depends upon free and vigorous nongovernmental educational institutions. Referring to the common-law
requirements of corporate benefit, the court concluded that it might
be considered in terms of survival of the corporation in the free
enterprise system.
The instant case further liberalizes the common-law rule in that the
benefit received by the corporation need be no greater than the benefit
received by the free enterprise system in general. 19 The minority
shareholder is still amply protected as both the statute and the expanded common-law rule require the contribution to be reasonable in
amount. As a matter of public policy the decision seems sound.
16. 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867).
17. See, e.g., Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 413,
415, 138 Atl. 659 (Ch. 1927), aff'd, 102 N.J. Eq. 302, 140 Atl. 321 (Ct. Err. & App.
1928); In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 391, 70 A.2d 159, 13 A.L.R.2d 1250
(1949).
18. Instant case, 98 A.2d at 587.
19. There are a few cases in which a contribution for the purpose of inducing other businesses to locate in the vicinity of the contributing corporation
has been held intra vires. See, e.g., Merchants' Bldg. Improvement Co. v.
Chicago Exchange Bldg. Co., 210 Ill. 26, 71 N.E. 22, 27 (1904). But where the
new business would locate in a different part of the city the contribution was
ultra vires. Orpheum Theater & Realty Co. v. Seavey & Flarsheim Brokerage
Co., 197 Mo. App. 661, 199 S.W. 257, 260 (1917).

RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS- CRIMINAL ANTf-TRUST ACTION INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS FOR LITIGATION EXPENSES
Plaintiff and defendant corporation were indicted for alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act which occurred during the time
he served as vice-president and director of the corporation. Plaintiff
employed legal counsel and paid $7500 for counsel services rendered
up to the time of trial. To avoid substantial attorneys' trial fees, plaintiff changed his plea to nolo contendere. He then brought action
against the defendant corporation under a statute providing for reimbursement by corporations to their directors for reasonable litigation
expenses incurred in defending actions brought against them by virtue
of their office. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant.
On appeal, held (4-3) affirmed. The statute was not intended to embrace expenses incurred in defending criminal anti-trust actions.1
Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 113 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1953).
In New York Dock Co. v. McCollom,2 the New York Supreme Court
held, contrary to most jurisdictions, 3 that the common law did not
allow a director's claim of reimbursement against the corporation for
litigation expenses incurred in successfully defending a stockholder's
suit, unless the corporation also derived a benefit from the litigation.
New York, as have other states,4 subsequently enacted a statute which
permitted directors and other corporate officers to be indemnified for
"reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, actually and necessarily incurred by him in connection with the defense of such action,
suit or proceeding... assessed against the corporation .... 5
The instant case, one of first impression, presents the problem of
whether the statute6 was intended to provide indemnification for di1.The court did not hold that the director's plea of nolo contendere would
be equivalent to a conviction, but by dictum indicated that a plea of nolo
contendere would be sufficient to prevent the director from claiming an

adjudication of his innocence; his suit against. the corporation would thereby
be automatically eliminated. Instant case, 113 N.E.2d at 536, 537.
2. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
3.E.g., In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Mlinn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950); Sol!mine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (Ch. 1941); Figge v. Bergenthal,
130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906), rehearing denied, 130 Wis. 594, 110 N.W.
798 (1907). See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
39 CoL. L. REV. 784 (1939). "The only case outside of New York clearly denying reimbursement after a successful defense by the director to a shareholder's
action is Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931)." Note, 37
CORNELL L.Q. 78, 80 n.10 (1951).

4. The following statutes provide that corporations may enact by-laws
which permit indenification of directors for litigation expenses: CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 5129 (1949); ME.REV. STAT. c. 49, § 23 (1944); MD.AwN. CODE GEN.
LAWS art. 23, § 60 (1951); N.J. STAT. AwN. § 14:3-14 (Supp. 1952).
The following statutes provide that directors shall be indemnified for expenses incurred in successfully defended suits: CAL. CORP. CODE AnmN. § 830
(1953); Ky. REV. STAT. A.w. § 271.375 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1953); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 351.355 (1949); MoxT.REV. CoDEs AxN. § 15-412 (1947).
5.N.Y.GEM.CORP.LAw § 64.

6. Ibid.
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rectors' expenses incurred in Sherman Act criminal prosecutions as
well as successfully defended derivative stockholder suits.
Because the statute7 does not expressly deny corporate directors indemnification for litigation expenses in such criminal cases, the court
could have allowed the director's claim without regard to the intention
of the legislature in enacting the statute. However, if the court was
convinced that the statute was ambiguous, it should properly have included the report of the Law Revision Commission 9 which proposed
the act in its determination of the legislative intent.10 The report suggested that the statute might apply to "a criminal proceeding against
the corporation or directors for violation of the anti-trust laws."1" The
report also stated that the maintenance of a special proceeding by a
director against a corporation might be appropriate to determine the
corporation's liability for indemnification of the director. As Judge
Fuld pointed out in his dissenting opinion,12 sub-division (b) of section 6513 provided for the suggested special proceeding.
As it is customary to automatically join directors as defendants in
anti-trust actions,14 it seems unjust to deny the director recovery of
attorneys' fees expended in such actions when he was not guilty of
negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties. When the
director rather than the corporation is at fault, reimbursement is
rightly denied; 15 however, to apply the same reasoning and result to
criminal anti-trust actions in which the corporation is at fault, is to
place an unfair burden upon the director who, at best, may have
difficulty avoiding violations of hazily defined anti-trust laws. It is
hoped, in fairness to corporate directors, that the decision of the instant
case will not set the trend which states with similar statutes will
follow in future cases of this kind.
7. CRAWFoRD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 164 (1940) and cases there
cited.
8. "Most cases blandly recognize the existence of a legislative intention."
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 163 at 253 (1940).
9. Id. at 161 n.36.
10. STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION 149

(1945).
11. Instant case, 113 N.E.2d at 540.
12. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 65 (b).
13. 38 STAT. 736, 15 U.S.C.A. § 24 (1951).
14. Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 288 Fed. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923);
see Hoch v. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928).
15. See note 4 supra.

1953 ]
EVIDENCE-
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PRESUMPTION OF LAW AND INFERENCE OF FACT RETROSPECTIVE PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUITY

In 1952 plaintiff, administrator of deceased's estate, brought action
against a fraternal benefit society and defendant beneficiary to recover the proceeds of a policy issued by the society to deceased in 1932
and paid to defendant beneficiary. Plaintiff contended that the beneficiary's right to proceeds was dependent upon whether she could
show that she was a legal beneficiary under the constitution, laws and
by-laws of the society at the time the policy was issued in 1932. The
evidence failed to show what the laws were in 1932, but did show
such laws as of June, 1949 and July, 1951 under which laws defendant
was a proper beneficiary. Held, for defendant. The laws in 1932
are presumed to be the same as those in 1949-1951; the presumption
of continuity can act retrospectively and in this connection each case
stands on its own peculiar facts. Brice v. Edwards, 260 S.W.2d 132
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
The only true presumption is a presumption of law.' It is to be distinguished from a conclusive presumption of law,2 presumption of
fact 3 and inference. 4 In its characteristic use it is not a synonym for
inference5 but is a rule of evidence which operates to place the burden
of producing evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact on
the party contesting its validity. 6 Once the basic fact is established,
the presumed fact must be assumed 7 until it is rebutted by the introduction of evidence opposed to it8 or another contradictory presump1. See Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 Okla. 257, 226 Pac. 65, 68, 69, 32 A.L.R,

1490 (1924); MORGAN, PREsUmPTIoNs: THEIR NATURE, PURPOSE AND REASON 3,
4 (An address published by Brandeis Lawyers Society, 1949); THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COmmoN LAW

MORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).

339-42 (1898); 9 WIG-

2. See Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N.W. 410, 412, 38 A.L.R.
814 (1924).
3. See Podolski v. Stone, 186 Ill. 540, 58 N.E. 340, 343 (1900). Professor
Thayer attributes the origin of the misapprehension as to the distinction to the
influence of the continental law on the English courts. He states that the
phrase presumption of fact was first mentioned by the text writers in 1791,
but that it was not until 1842-1844 that the phraseology was fairly well shaped.
THAYER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 343.
4. See Rose v. Missouri Dist. Telegraph Co., 328 Mo. 1009, 43 S.W.2d 562,
569, 81 A.L.R. 400 (1931). But note Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial
Board, 277 fI. 96, 115 N.E. 149 (1917). See also, Note, Ann. Cas. 1913B 897;
10 R.C.L., Evidence §§ 10, 11 (1915).
5. See Rose v. Missouri Dist. Telegraph Co., 328 Mo. 1009, 43 S.W.2d 562,
569, 81 A.L.R. 400 (1931).
6. See Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644, 647, 95
A.L.R. 869 (1934). This is recognized as the Thayerian rule and is the only
effect of a presumption. MoODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 55 (1942). But see
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906
(1931).
7. See Joyce v. Missouri and Kansas Telephone Co., 211 S.W. 900, 901 (Mo.
App. 1918).
8. See City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350, 35a
(1944).
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tion 9 is raised; but in no instance will the basic fact lose its probative
value.10 The phrase "presumption of fact" is a misnomer, being in
truth nothing more than an inference." It does not compel the trier
of fact to assume the presumed fact,' 2 nor operate to shift the duty
of going forward with evidence to contradict the presumed fact. 3 It is
a mere logical inference which common sense and experience will
allow. 14
Early Texas decision recognize both presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. 15 Later opinions use the terms prima facie case,
presumption and inference interchangeably, 16 while others distinguish
the terms17 by their consequences. Again the court calls a presumption
of law a presumption of fact, which is required by "positive law" but
is rebuttable. 18 Also, a presumption of fact as used in Texas does not
compel a shift in the burden of producing evidence nor compel an
assumption of the presumed fact in the absence of evidence, but
rather, it raises an inference from a proven basic fact which the trier
of fact may or may not find. 19 Thus the court in the principal case
followed its past decisions and, under the label of presumption, inferred what the laws of the society were in 1932.20
When presumption is used in its true sense, all courts agree that
9. Ibid.
10. Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 138 Tex. 450, 159 S.W.2d 854
(1942); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704 (1942).
11. See Modem Woodmen of America v. Kincheloe, 47 Ind. App. 331, 93
N.E. 452, 454 (1910).
12. Basham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 232 Mo. App. 782, 113 S.W.2d
126 (1,938).
13. See Page v. Lockley, 176 S.W.2d 991, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev'd on
other grounds, 142 Tex. 594, 180 S.W.2d 616 (1944); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2491 (3d ed.1940).
14. See Chicago, R.I. &P. Ry. v. Rhodes, 64 Kan. 553, 68 Pac. 58 (1902).
15. "[Tlhe latter [presumptions of fact] are merely those natural promptings which are derived wholly and directly from the circumstances of the
particular case, without the aid or control of any rule of law, and which are
sufficient to satisfy the understandings and consciences of an ordinary jury."
Johnson v. Timmons, 50 Tex. 521, 535-36 (1878). "They are not rules of law
to be obeyed, but of reason, to be considered." Brown v. State, 23 Tex. 200
(1859).

16. See Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 138 Tex. 450, 159 S.W.2d 854,
858 (1942). But cf. Page v. Lockley, 176 S.W.2d 991, 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943), where the court said of the Greenwade Case, "[C]onclusion [there]
was based upon failure to recognize the distinction between a presumption
and an inference."
17. "[A] presumption is a rule which the law makes upon a given state of
facts, while an inference is a conclusion which by means of data founded upon
common experience, natural reason draws from facts which are proved."
Page v. Lockley, 176 S.W.2d 991, 998 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 142 Tex. 594, 180 S.W.2d 616 (1944).
18. See Stooksberry v. Swann, 85 Tex. 563, 22 S.W. 963, 967 (1893).

19. Page v. Lockley, 176 S.W.2d 991, 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev'd on

other grounds, 142 Tex. 594, 180 S.W.2d 616 (1944).
20. Other states use the terms presumption and inference interchangeably:
Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 227 Ill. 96, 115 N.E. 149

(1917); State v. Kelley, 57 Iowa 644, 11 N.W. 635, 636 (1882).
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the presumption of continuity is prospective and not retrospective, 21
which would, strictly speaking, be contrary to the present case. When
the so-called retrospective presumption is indulged, the courts are in
reality using the term as a synonym for inference. 22 Whether the inference will be allowed depends upon considerations of time,2 tendency of condition toward change24 and the circumstances of each
case. 25 Thus, the distinction has been recognized between inference and
presumption as applied to the doctrine of continuity in its retro26
spective use.
The Texas decisions recognize the view that the doctrine of continuity will not be applied as a retrospective presumption. 27 Rather,
that court expressly adopts Professor Wigmore's view which is stated
in terms of an inference and not a presumption.28 Thus the decision
in the instant case is in harmony with those of other jurisdictions allowing the retrospective operation of a condition when properly inferred; presumption as used here is synonymous with inference. It
did not shift the burden of proof, but under the circumstances was
sufficiently strong to allow the court to infer the laws of 1932 from
the establishment of those in 1949 and 1951. It is not contrary to the
proposition that a presumption of continuity only operates prospectively and not retrospectively, but is merely an example of what
Professor Wigmore termed "the variegated inconsistences" in this
field. The adoption of the American Law Institute's Model Code of
29
Evidence would have a stabilizing influence in this regard.
21. See Killoren Electric Co. v. Hon, 211 Ark. 403, 200 S.W.2d 775 (1947);
20 Am. Jun., Evidence § 210 (1939); 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 140 (1942).

22. Gibson v. Brown, 214 I. 330, 73 N.E. 578 (1905); Phipps v. Consolidated

Flour Mills Co., 113 Kan. 118, 213 Pac. 637 (1923); Grand Forks County v.
Baird, 54 N.D. 315, 209 N.W. 732 (1926). Examination of these cases will show
that the conclusions drawn are based on the surrounding circumstances and
do not follow from the operation of any rule of law.

23. Johnson v. Charles William Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 157 AUt. 902
(1932).
24. Bolomey v. Houchins, 227 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. App. 1950).
25. Harlin v. Calvert's Adm'x, 253 Ky. 752, 70 S.W.2d 524 (1934).
26. Presumptions of continuity do not run backwards. Conduitt v. Trenton
Gas & Elec. Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S.W.2d 21 (1930); depending on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case a retrospective inference may be indulged. Bolomey v. Houchins, 227 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. App. 1950).
27. "The presumption will not prevail retrospectively, but the situation in

1910 was a circumstance which can be looked to for what it is worth. It does
not rise to the dignity of a presumption, but it is nevertheless a fact or cir-

cumstance which may be entitled to some consideration." Ralls v. Parish,
151 S.W. 1091 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
28. See Ross v. Green, 135 Tex. 103, 139 S.W.2d 565, 571 (1940), citing 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 437 (2d ed. 1923). Professor Wigmore recognizes that
an inference may have previously existed depending on the circumstances of
the case and reasonable limits as to remoteness of time.
29. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 701 (1942). Inconsistencies in the meaning
and use of the term "presumption" would be eliminated by adoption of Rule
701.
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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-CLASS ACTIONSDISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT
Plaintiffs, Negro residents of Kansas City, Missouri, filed suit in the
federal district court against the City and Board of Park Commissioners, seeking individually, and as representatives of their race, a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to eliminate racial discrimination allegedly implicit in the segregation policy under which
plaintiffs were denied admittance to a municipally owned swimming

pool. The court, finding that separate facilities provided Negroes were
unequal and that denial of swimming privileges in the park constituted unequal treatment, held such inequalities to be violative of
civil rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly,
the relief prayed was granted individually, but class relief was denied
on the ground1 that other Negroes had not been shown to have tendered the admission price and been denied admittance. Held, affirmed. Unequal treatment was unconstitutional and violative of Civil
Rights Act; 2 propriety of class relief is in trial court's judgment as to
its usefulness in the particular situation. Kansas City, Mo. v. Williams,
205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 45 (U.S. 1953).3
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one or more
individuals who adequately represent a class whose rights have been
violated may, if the class is so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring each member before the court, sue on behalf of all.4 Situa1. The trial court's first basis for the denial of class relief was that "it is the
individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the law, and ... he has
no standing to sue for the deprivation of similar civil rights of others." This
ground was expressly refuted by the court of appeals. Instant case, 205 F.2d
at 51-52.
2. REv. STAT. §§ 1977, 1979 (1875), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 43 (1942).
3. The petition for certiorari was filed by the City, and apparently the procedural issue was not before the court for consideration. 22 U.S.L. WEEK
3085 (1953).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a). Rule 23 "is a substantial restatement of former
Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule has been construed."
NOTES OF ADVIsoRY COM=MTEE ON RULEs, 28 U.S.C.A. 83 (1948). Three types
of class actions (popularly called the true, the hybrid and the spurious) are authorized by Rule 23. In the true class action the character of the right sought
to be enforced for or against the class is joint, common or secondary. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (1). In hybrid class action the right involved is several and
the object is the adjudication of claims which may affect specific property.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2). In the spurious class action the right is several and
there must be a common question of law or fact and common relief sought.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3). Great difficulty has been experienced by the bench
and bar in properly categorizing the cases as they have arisen, and the value
of the classifications has been judicially and academically challenged. See
comment by McAllister, J., in System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991,
996 (6th Cir. 1950); Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties under Modern
Pleading Rules, 36 Mmw. L. REV. 580, 626 (1952). See critical discussion of the
rule in CHA.FEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 243-95 (1950). But see argument
for classifications in 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 23.02-23.12 (2d ed. 1948).
The court in the instant case, denying class relief on other grounds, was not
faced with the necessity of classifying the right asserted as common or
several. Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), affd,
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tions in which civil rights have been abrogated or infringed by administrative policy or legislative mandate have in recent years been
prolific breeding grounds for class actions.5 Because racial discrimination by definition delimits the particular class affected and because
entrenched prejudices characteristic of civil rights disputes encourage
litigation by each individual discriminated against, the class action,
whose raison d'etre is the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits,6 is
particularly appropriate in such situations.
The district court in the principal case takes the position that class
relief is inappropriate because the evidence does not disclose that Negroes other than the plaintiffs have been denied admittance to the
pool on the basis of race.7 This position is apparently based upon
the theory that it is only the act of denying admittance rather than the
establishment of a policy of exclusion which is unconstitutional, and
that those who have not been denied admittance are without the class
affected by the defendant's unconstitutional conduct. 8
340 U.S. 909 (1951), and Johnson v. Board of Trustees, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E.D.
Ky. 1949), both indistinguishable from the instant case on the facts, were considered true class actions. Accord, Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.
Cal. 1944). See 2 BARzoN & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 148
(1950). But cf. Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951) (discrimination in public school system a basis for spurious class action). The
writer in 21 KAN. CITY L. REV. 215 (1953),

commenting on the instant case,

considered it a spurious class action. For an interesting discussion of the classification problem, see Lesar, Class Suits and the FederalRules, 22 MINN. L. REV.

34 (1937).
5. Class actions involving discrimination in admittance to educational institutions: Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Wilson
v. Board of Supervisors, supra note 4; Johnson v. Board of Trustees, supra
note 4; Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. S.C. 1947). Class
actions based on discrimination in public school system: Carter v. School

Board, 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950); Gonzales v. Sheely, supra note 4. Class
actions founded on salary discrimination against Negro teachers: Morris v.

Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945); Alston v. School Board, 112 F.2d 992,

130 A.L.R. 1506 (4th Cir. 1940); Davis v. Cook, 80 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ga.

1948); Whitmyer v. Lincoln Parish School Board, 75 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. La.

1948); Thomas v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368 (M.D. Tenn. 1942); McDaniel v.
Board of Public Instruction, 39 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Fla. 1941). Class actions
based on discrimination in admittance to municipally operated places of recreation: Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951) (golf course); Harris v.
Daytona Beach, 105 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1952) (city auditorium); Draper
v. St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950) (swimming pool); Lopez v.
Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944) (swimming pool). The class action

device was used to attack discriminatory zoning regulations in Birmingham v.
Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).

6. See Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952). The
purpose of the rule as stated by Mr. Justice Stone in Hansberry v. Lee is
"to enable it [equity courts] to proceed to a decree in suits where the number
of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder
as parties in conformity with the usual rules of procedure is impracticable."
311 U.S. 32, 41, 61 Sup. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22; 132 A.L.R. 741 (1940). It is submitted that in the absence of a class action device the impossibility or impracticability of joinder would tend to produce a multiplicity. Therefore both
reasons are but different aspects of one idea: convenience. See System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, supra note 4; CHAFES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 201, 280.
7. Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., 104 F. Supp. 848, 857 (W.D. Mo. 1952).

8. The unstated reason back of the district court's requirement of actual
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Plaintiffs, however, seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Neither
a cause of action nor an invasion of rights is prerequisite to the maintenance of a declaratory judgment action. 9 The provisions of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act are satisfied if an actual controversy exists between the parties to the action.'0 In several recent cases
one or more individuals, who in addition to being members of the
class affected by the defendants' discriminatory policy also had causes
of action because of defendants' acts under that policy, have successfully maintained class suits for declaratory judgments.' Since in none
of these cases is actual denial made a condition precedent to membership in the aggrieved class, the only basis for class relief is the unconstitutionality of the "policy, custom and usage" of which the overt
acts of exclusion are but incidents. Frequently injunctive relief has
12
been granted to protect the civil rights thus declared.
denial seems to be that in the absence of such denial defendants had not
breached any duty which they owed to the broad class which plaintiffs seek

to represent or to the individual members thereof. Defendants, however, admitted a policy of exclusion, and the trial court conceded that "had other Negro
citizens so applied they likewise would have received the same treatment as
did plaintiffs." Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 7 at 857. The question
remains whether the policy sufficiently affected the Negroes in Kansas City
to be a basis for judicial action thus creating a genuine community of interest.
See generally, on the necessity of a community of interest, Note, 132 A.L.R.
749 (1941).
9. "It may be stated unhesitatingly that one of the very purposes of the
declaratory action is to be relieved, of the more or less technical rule obtaining
at common law, that no right may be judicially adjudged until such right has
been violated or invaded . . .a cause of action, in the sense in which that
term is ordinarily used, is not essential to the assumption of jurisdiction in

this form of procedure." 1

ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

§ 238 (2d ed.

1951). "[A]ctual breach or violation, violence, accrual of damages, etc. are
not necessary to maturity of the declartory judgment action." Spark, The

Scope of Declaratory Judgment Suits (to be published in REVISTA JURIDICA
DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico). The exact point at which a dispute becomes judicially cognizable seems to be generally defined by alluding to what
requirements need not exist, and as yet no formula seems to have evolved by
means of which a justiciable controversy can safely be predicted in advance
of actual litigation of the case in question. Compare United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) (where federal
employees who had not violated the Hatch Act were held to be premature in
contesting the constitutionality of the act) with cases cited infra note 12 (where
individuals who had not been actually denied admittance were considered
members of the class in whose behalf representative actions were brought by
individuals who had in fact been denied admittance under exclusionary policy).
See generally on the characteristics of the declaratory judgment, BORcHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

25-86 (2d ed. 1941).

10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (1950).
11. Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951); Harris v. Daytona Beach,
105 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1952); Johnson v. Board of Trustees, 83 F. Supp. 707
(E.D. Ky. 1949); Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C.
1947). Accord, Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
Cf. Wilson v. Board of Supervisars, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950) (where
an administrative order denying admission of Negroes to state university was
held to violate equal protection clause of United States Constitution and was
enjoined in a class action without resort to a declaratory action).
12. Beal v. Holcombe, supra note 11; Harris v. Daytona Beach, supra note
11; Wilson v. City of Paducah, supra note 11; Wrighten v. Board of Trustees,
supra note 11. The federal courts are authorized to grant "further necessary
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The court of appeals, in harmony with the cases mentioned above,
commented on the "technical and unrealistic" viewpoint that proof of
exclusion of others was essential to the granting of class relief, noting
"the Park Board's admitted policy of exclusion."'13 The court, however,
influenced by the consideration that the defendant presumably would
voluntarily give the adjudication a class operation, affirmed on the
basis14 that "a trial court is not without some measure of judgment
as to whether a class adjudication can serve any useful [legal] 15 pur6
pose in a particular situation.'
It is well-settled that the trial court may deny class relief if in its
judgment the plaintiffs do not adequately represent the class 1 or the
class is not so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring each
member before the court.'8 Both of these bases are rooted in the wording of Rule 23 as express limitations on the class action device. 9 The
"useful legal purpose" test herein enunciated, however, is neither provided for in the rule itself nor applied in any case heretofore interpreting the rule. This test represents a new judicial limitation on the class
action device.
In the recent case of. Wilson v. City of Paducah,20 Negro plaintiffs
had been denied admission to a junior college because of their race.
A declaratory judgment to the effect that such segregation was unconstitutional had been entered against the defendant city in a class
suit a year previously. It was held that plaintiffs were members of the
class in whose behalf the prior judgment had been rendered and they
were allowed to intervene and secure an injunction to enforce their
established right. In that case, as in the principal case, the defendant
is a city possessed of funds for the relitigation of issues in which the
or proper relief .

.

. against any adverse party whose rights have been de-

termined by such [declaratory] judgment." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2202 (1950).

13. Instant case, 205 F.2d at 52.
14. It must be noted that the basis on which the denial of class relief was
affirmed was not discussed by the trial court in its memorandum opinion as a
basis for the denial of such relief. Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., 104 F. Supp.
848 (W.D. Mo. 1952). Apparently the affirmation rests on a basis that was not
an issue in the hearing or consideration of the case.
15. The qualifying adjective may properly be incorporated into the holding
since elsewhere in the opinion, the court, in discussing the criteria for class
relief, says it is appropriate "where the granting of such relief seems likely
to serve some useful legal purpose -for example, preventing a multiplicity of
suits." Instant case, 205 F.2d at 52.
16. Instant case, 205 F.2d at 52.
17. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940);
Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947); 2 BARRON &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 567 (1950); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE § 23.07 (2d ed. 1948); 3 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 414-16 (1948).
18. In re Engelhard, 231 U.S. 646, 34 Sup. Ct. 258, 58 L. Ed. 416 (1914); Rank
v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950); 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.05
(2d ed. 1948); 3 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 413-14 (1948).
19. FED. R. Cir. P. 23 (a).
20. 100 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
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public interest is sufficiently strong. It is probably true that class
prejudice is stronger against mixed races in the swimming pool than
in the classroom. The city's failure to abide in good faith by a judgment in a class action in the Paducah case necessitated intervention
to secure the right already adjudicated, while in the instant case the
presumption that the defendant would voluntarily give the individual
relief granted a class application was made the basis for affirming the
denial of class relief.
It may be that the court's assumption is based on factors not disclosed in its opinion and that in this particular situation substantial
justice will obtain.2 ' In applying the "useful legal purpose" test to
reach this result, however, a precedent has been laid which, if followed, will endanger the growth and usefulness of Rule 23. 22 Predictability is as essential to the usefulness of a procedural device as
it is desirable in the realm of substantive law. The determination of
the appropriateness of class relief in a particular situation by judicial
speculation as to the future course of the defendant's conduct would
go far toward destroying that predictability.

INCOME TAXATION - DEDUCTIONS "ORDINARY AND NECESSARY" EXPENSES
Taxpayer, a member of a law firm which engaged in considerable
tax practice and which relied on taxpayer to keep abreast of developments in the field of tax law, attended a New York University Institute on Federal Taxation. He incurred expenses of $305 for tuition,
board and lodging in attending the Institute for which he claimed a
deduction under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code
as ordinary and necessary expenses. The Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction, four judges dissenting.'
On appeal, held, reversed. Since these expenses were incurred through
immediate, over-all professional requirements regarding the current
status of tax law, they are deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses. Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
To be deductible as "ordinary and necessary" within section 23 (a)
21. The city authorities, restrained from operating the pool under a policy
of segregation, closed the half-million dollar pool to both races pending the
outcome of their appeal and petition for certiorari. Joint Memorandum,
American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (Oct.
27, 1953).
22. As to the extension of the class action device to all fields of civil litigation
by Rule 23, the court in Montgomery Ward v. Langer said, "If the device is to
be loaded down with arbitrary and technical restrictions, it will serve no very
useful purpose in the enlarged field. If, on the other hand, the courts will...
permit the Rule to operate in all cases to which it justly and soundly may be
applied, it will serve its intended purpose." 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
1. 18 T.C. 528 (1952).
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(1) (A) ,2 the expense must bear a direct relation to the conduct of the
business in which the taxpayer is engaged. 3 What is included as
"ordinary and necessary" must be determined according to the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the expense. 4 The test
may be "what the average hardheaded businessman would have done
under like circumstances." 5 The words used in the statute are to be
taken in their usual everyday meaning and construed broadly "to
facilitate business generally, so that any necessary expense, not actually a capital investment, incurred in good faith.., is to be con'6
sidered an ordinary expense of that business.
Nondeductible personal expenses and capital expenditures are to
be distinguished from business expenses. An item ordinarily falls
within the deductible business expenses classification only if it is incurred in producing, or in the expectation of producing, revenues.
Situations where expenses for personal enjoyment merge with those
for business interests provide the hard cases. To be deductible they
must meet the "ordinary and necessary" requirement and must be
reasonable in amount. 7 However, if the result of an outlay of money
is the acquisition of an asset which has a lasting or improving nature,
then the outlay is a nondeductible capital expenditure. 8 To qualify
as a deductible business expense, the benefits received therefrom
must not carry over into later years to an appreciable extent. There
must be no continuing benefit of an indefinite duration.
Deductible professional expenses incurred by one practicing his
profession are subject to the same requirements and restrictions. Under Regulation 1189 a professional man is allowed to deduct expenses
incurred in the practice of his profession. In particular, a lawyer has
been allowed to deduct Bar Association expenses, dues, costs of publishing his card in newspapers and certain client entertainment
expenses. 10
2. "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the

taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .. " INT. RE V. CODE §
23(a) (1) (A).
3. See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416
(1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 54 Sup. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 212 (1933);
Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153, 48 Sup. Ct. 219, 72 L. Ed. 505
(1928).
4. See cases cited note 3 supra; 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 25.07 (1942).
5. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 319.
6. Harris & Co. v. Lucas, 48 F.2d 187, 188 (5th Cir. 1931). This is in effect
the construction given by the Treasury Department and the Courts.
7. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 25.14; Dean, Deductible Expenses of
the ProfessionalPerson,N.Y.U. NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION

349 (1950); Comment, Income Tax Deductions for the Lawyer, 24 BAR BULL.
43 (1953).
8. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 25.17.
9. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-5 (1953).
10. Wade H. Ellis, 15 B.T.A. 1075, ajFd, 50 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (traveling expenses in attending a meeting of the American Bar Association deductible); Henry P. Keith, P-H 1942 T.C. MEM. DEC.
42,630 (1942) (deduction
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Money expended for reputation, good will or education generally
has not been allowed under section 23(a) (1) (A) because it is considered a capital investment.' However, Hill v. Commissioner12 held
that a school teacher's summer school expenses, incurred for the purpose of maintaining her position, were deductible. Where expenses
are incurred to obtain a teaching position or to qualify for permanent
status, a higher position, an advance in salary schedule, or to fulfill
general cultural aspirations, they are nondeductible because they are
capital expenditures. The decision in the instant case is in accord with
the limited application of Hill v. Commissioner,13 to be distinguished
only by the degree of necessity prompting the expense. The allowance
of this deduction finds further justification in the restricted purpose
of the expense. To stay abreast of the changing tax laws one must
keep informed.14 Consequently, money expended for such knowledge
is a current expense, the benefit from which is realized during the
taxable year; the cost is, therefore, a business expense. Even though
educational in nature, expenses incurred in attending conventions also
have been held deductible on the theory that no lasting benefit is received therefrom.' 5 Furthermore, they are incurred for the purpose
of allowing the taxpayer to keep informed of the new developments,
trends and practices in the particular trade, business or profession.
Likewise, the expenses necessary to keep informed on current tax
changes appear deductible for the same reasons.
Thus, in order for educational expenses of professional persons to
be deductible, they must withstand attack both as to their personal
character and their capital nature. These expenditures seem to fall
into three categories: capital expenditure, personal expense and
business expenses. 16 The instant case certainly is included in the
allowed for annual bar association dues); Comment, 24 BAR BULL. 43 (1953)
(includes entertainment expenses for clients).
11. "Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will
of an old partnership.... For many, they are the only tools with which to hew
a pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely
spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a business." Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16, 54 Sup. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 212 (1933). See Manoel
Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951); Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950).
12. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), reversing 13 T.C. 291.
13. In both instances the petitioner claims the expenses were incurred:
(1) to maintain an existing position, not to attain a new one; (2) to preserve
the position, not to expand or increase it; (3) to carry on a profession, not to
commence one.
14. The Institute was not conducted for students or for those unversed in
federal taxation. Only tax specialists attended. It "was designed by its sponsors to provide a place and atmosphere where practitioners could gather
trends, thinking, and developments in the field of Federal taxation from experts accomplished in that field." George G. Coughlin, 18 T.C. 528, 529 (1952).
15. 4 IERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.107 (1942).
16. Expenditures for educational purposes are distinguishable by classification: (1) When an education is obtained to equip one for his life's vocation,
it is a capital expenditure. Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950). (2) Sometimes an education is purely personal in nature when it is sought to gain
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"current information" class of the business expense category. Although
the decision is not authority for cases where a taxpayer has enrolled
in courses to obtain an education, it should control in those instances
where current knowledge is needed in carrying on a business or
profession.

INCOME TAXATION

-

FALSE STATEMENTS

-

CRIMINAL PENALTIES

Section 1001 of the Criminal Code' provides that it is unlawful to
make false statements to departments or agencies of the United States
concerning any matter within their jurisdiction. After the three year
statute of limitations had run on this section, the defendant was indicted under § 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code2 which is governed by a six year statute, for willfully making false statements to
Treasury representatives in order to evade taxes. The District Court,
reasoning that Congress must have intended the making of false
statements to be punishable only under the section dealing specifically
therewith, dismissed the indictment as not charging an offense under
145 (b). Held, reversed. Section 145 (b), which outlaws willful attempts to evade taxes in any manner, is broad enough to cover false
statements made to Treasury representatives for the purpose of concealing unreported income. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S.
43, 73 Sup. Ct. 77, 97 L. Ed. 1 (1952).
Section 145 is the primary criminal penalty statute of the Internal
4
Revenue Code.3 Subsection (a) makes a willful failure to file a return,
5
keep records or submit information a misdemeanor. To prove a violation of § 145 (a) it must be shown that the taxpayer had a duty to
perform the omitted act;6 that he failed to perform within the prescribed time; and that his failure to perform was due to an evil
prestige, to acquire culture or to improve one's reputation. Manoel Cardozo,
17 T.C. 3 (1951). (3) When current information is necessary to equip one for
a year's work, the cost of such an education is considered a business expense.
Instant case, 203 F.2d at 309.
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1950).

2. IT. REV. CODE § 145(b). "[A]ny person who willfully attempts in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this Chapter... shall be guilty
of a felony...."
3. For an article on income tax penalties, see Gordon, Income Tax Penalties,
5 TAX L.REV. 131 (1950).
4. United States v. Sullivan, 98 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1938); Kittrell v. United
States, 76 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 643 (1935); Hargrove v.
United States, 67 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933); United States v. Commerford, 64
F.2d 28 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 289 U.S. 759 (1933); United States v. Miro, 60
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1932); Oliver v. United States, 54 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 543 (1932); O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673 (1931).
5. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 Sup. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed. 381
(1933).
6. See United States v. McCormick, 67 F.2d 867, 868 (2d Cir. 1933), cert.
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motive. 7 Subsection (b) makes it a felony to attempt willfully to
defeat or evade a tax in any manner. In order to prove a violation of
§ 145 (b), it need only be shown that some tax was due or unpaid,9 and
there was a willful attempt to evade it.1O Prior to the Spies" case it
had been held that willfully failing to file a return not only violated
subsection (a), but was also a willful attempt within subsection (b).12
In overruling the earlier decisions the court in the Spies case held that
in order to violate § 145 (b) there must be affirmative attempts to
evade, in addition to the omissions of duty under § 145 (a).
Willful attempts have been found where taxpayers kept a double set
of books,' 3 made excessive deductions,14 concealed assets15 or income,1 6 paid fictitious bonuses or salaries, 17 understated1 8 or did not
denied, 291 U.S. 662 (1934).
7. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 Sup. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed. 381

(1933); United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 759 (1933).
8. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396, 54 Sup. Ct. 223, 226,
78 L. Ed. 381, 386 (1933) (bona fide misunderstanding of tax liability is not
willful). That direct proof of willful intent is not necessary, but may be inferred from the acts of the parties, see Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1,
5 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321, 329 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 893 (1949), rehearingdenied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950).
9. The United States need not prove the exact amount of evasion, but only

that there has been some evasion. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503,
63 Sup. Ct. 1233, 87 L. Ed. 1546 (1943); United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d
321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 893 (1949), rehearing denied, 338 U.S.
940 (1950); Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 831, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949); Stinnett v. United States,
173 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949); Gleckman v. United
States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1936).
10. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 493, 63 Sup. Ct. 364, 365, 87 L. Ed.
418, 420 (1943); Jones v. United States, 164 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1948). A

fraudulent return is always a willful attempt to evade a tax. Rick v. United
States, 161 F.2d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (construing § 1542(b) of D.C. Code
[later repealed, 61 STAT. 331 (1947)] which uses same language as 145(b));
United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321, 329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
893 (1949), rehearingdenied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950).
11. 317 U.S. 492, 63 Sup. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418 (1943).
12. United States v. Sullivan, 98 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1938); Kittrell v. United
States, 76 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 643 (1935); United States
v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Ci.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 759 (1933); United
States v. Miro, 60 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1932); O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 193
(7th Ci.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673 (1931).
13. United States v. Yeoman-Henderson, Inc., 193 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1952);
Shinyu Noro v. United States, 148 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 720
(1945); accord, Maxfield v. United States, 152 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1945), cert.

denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1946) (planned to keep a double set of books).

14. United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 62 Sup. Ct. 374, 86 L. Ed. 383 (1942);
United States v. Lange, 161 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947).
15. United States v. Zimmerman, 108 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1939); Paschen v.
United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934); Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d
618 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 545 (1932).
16. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 63 Sup. Ct. 1233, 87 L. Ed. 1546
(1943); United States v. Yeoman-Henderson, Inc., 193 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1952);
Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917,
rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951); Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d
397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831, rehearingdenied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949);
Stinnett v. United States, 173 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957
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report1 9 sales, or prepared false returns for others. 20 Taxpayers have
contended that the filing of a false and fraudulent return is not per se
a willful attempt within § 145 (b), but this contention has uniformly
been rejected. 21 Where inadequate records have been kept, the United
States has had to prove the return false and fraudulent by evidence of
bank deposits,22 expenditures,2 or an increase in net worth2 4 for the
year in excess of reported income. In the instant case, however, none
of the acts previously interpreted as willful attempts to evade a tax
were relied upon. The United States relied solely on the false statements made during the course of an investigation of the taxpayer's
return.2
(1949); United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 853 (1948).
17. Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1949); Locke v. United
States, 166 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 837 (1948); United States
v. Lange, 161 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947).
18. Barrow v. United States, 171 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1948).
19. Kirsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1949); Batties v. United
States, 172 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Lange, 161 F.2d 699 (7th
Cir. 1947).
20. Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 689, rehearingdenied, 301 U.S. 715 (1937).
21. United States v. Croessant, 178 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1949); Rick v. United
States, 161 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (construing § 1542(b) of D.C. Code
[later repealed, 61 STAT. 331 (1947)] which used same language as 145(b));
Cave v. United States, 159 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1947); see, United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321, 330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 893 (1949), rehearing
denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950); cf. Kirsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 595 (8th Cir.
1949).
22. United States v. Yeoman-Henderson, Inc., 193 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1952);
Stinnett v. United States, 173 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957
(1949); Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
297 U.S. 709 (1936); Chadick v. United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 609 (1935); Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 285 U.S. 545 (1932). See Webster, Section 145(b) and PriorAccumulated Funds, 28 TAxEs 1065, 1066 (1950).

23. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 63 Sup. Ct. 1233, 87 L. Ed. 1546
(1943); United States v. Yeoman-Henderson, Inc., 193 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1952);
Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
831, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949); Stinnett v. United States, 173 F.2d
129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949); United States v. Skidmore,
123 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 800, rehearing denied, 315
U.S. 828 (1942).
24. Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 831, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949); United States v. Chapman,
168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948); Gleckman v. United
States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1936); United
States v. Messick, 85 F. Supp. 928 (D. Del. 1949). Before there can be a conviction the United States must establish the starting point from which to
prove the increased net worth. United States v. Fenwick, 177 F.2d 488 (7th
Cir. 1949); Bryan v. United States, 175 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949), af'd on
other grounds, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). See Avakian, The Net Worth Method of
EstablishingFraud, N.Y.U. ELEVENTH ANNUAL INsTiTUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
707 (1952).
25. The statute of limitations had already run on the filing of a false and
fraudulent return. The statute of limitations begins running criminally on the
false and fraudulent return from the day it is filed. See Myres v. United
States, 174 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 849 (1949); United
States v. Mathis, 28 F. Supp. 582 (D.N.J, 1939).
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This case extended § 145 (b) beyond any previous application, but
the broad language of the statute seems to justify the result. Since
§ 145 (b) is governed by a six year period of limitations, the effect of
this case renders Criminal Code § 1001, which is governed by a three
year statute of limitations, obsolete insofar as prosecution is based on
false statements made to the Internal Revenue Service. In view of the
liberal interpretation of § 145 (b) the implication of the instant case
is that any willful act, the effect of which is to evade or defeat the
income tax; is within the coverage of § 145 (b).

LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS - SPECIFIC
ENFORCEMENT IN FEDERAL COURTS
Plaintiff, a union representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce, sought a federal district court order, pursuant to § 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act,1 to compel specific enforcement of an executory
arbitration agreement. Defendant employer refused to submit the
question of separation pay of ten employees to arbitration and contended that the federal district court was without authority to direct
specific performance of arbitration agreements. Held, Congress intended that § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act should provide a nationally
available remedy of specific performance of arbitration clauses in
labor contracts. Textile Workers Union of America (CIO) v. American
Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
At common law an executory contract to arbitrate future disputes
was legal but unenforceable;2 the courts jealously protected their
jurisdiction from encroachment by extra-judicial bodies. 3 Although
this anomalous principle of legality without enforceability has been
changed by statute in some instances, 4 it still generally applies to arbi1. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter..,. may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 61 STAT. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (Supp. 1952).
2. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Comment, Arbitration
of Labor Contract Interpretation Disputes, 43 ILL. L. REV. 678 (1948); See
Latter v. Holsom Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421, 424 (1945) (concurring
opinion).
3. Scott v. Avery, 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 853, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (1855-56);
note the incorporation of this doctrine, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 550 (1932).
See also Pound, The American ArbitrationAssociation, 8 Ann. J. 21-22 (1953).
"[T]here was at one time some jealousy of agreements to arbitrate .... It was
considered that such agreements tended to oust the courts from their jurisdiction, but long ago this attitude was given up."
4. Interpretation of the statutes has varied. Seven states which have enacted the Draft State Arbitration Act have held that future disputes in
collective bargaining contracts are thereby made enforceable. At least nine
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tration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 5 It diminishes
the usefulness of such clauses and deprives the parties of a previously
bargained for and undoubtedly valuable instrument for maintaining
industrial peace.8
Congress, persuaded that adequate means of remedying violations
of collective bargaining agreements did not exist, sought to encourage
the performance of such agreements by the enactment of § 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act which expressly provides a federal forum in which
employers and labor organizations may sue for violation of collective
bargaining agreements. 7 Whether this section also afforded legislative authority for the specific enforcement of an arbitration contract
depends upon what law, substantive and remedial, Congress intended
the federal courts to apply under § 301.
If Congress' only intention in the enactment of § 301 was to create
a federal forum in which employers and labor organizations could sue
and be sued, then the legislation is only jurisdictional in terms and
meaning. Under this theory the sole purpose of § 301 would be to
avoid only the procedural obstacles existing in the several states,8 the
rights of the parties being determined by state substantive law.9 This
would assume that Congress neither specified nor intended to specify
any substantive criteria by which to determine the enforceability of
an arbitration agreement. Although some of the legislative history of
other states which have enacted the Draft State Arbitration Act have held
that labor contracts are not covered by the statute. This problem is clarified
in the new proposed Draft of an Arbitration Act, 7 Axw. J. 201, 202 (1952). See,

for further details, Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 233, 238 (1950); Comment, 43 ILL. L.
REV.

678, 683 (1948).

5. Utility Workers Union of America v. Ohio Power Co., 77 N.E.2d 629,
630 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1947); Local 1111 of Elec., Radio, and Machine Workers
of America v. Allen-Bradley Co., 259 Wis. 609, 49 N.W.2d 720, 724 (1951)
(interprets statute as declaring public policy against enforcement of arbitration clauses). Compare not 4 supra.
6. See National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995, 23 L.R.R.M. 1148
(1948); Katz and Jaffe, Enforcing Labor Arbitration Clauses by Section 301,
Taft-Hartley Act, 8 ArB. J. 80, 81 (1953); Note, Specific Performance of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 37 VA. L. REv. 739, 751 (1951); Pound, supra
note 3, at 22.
7. See Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 83 F.
Supp. 162, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Note, 17 A.L.R.2d 614, 615 (1951); Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 I-ARv. L. REV. 274,
304 (1948); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL.
L. REV. 157, 186 n.130 (1953).
8. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. International Brotherhood of Paper
Makers, 191 F.2d 252, 253 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 933 (1952)
(construed in accordance with Penn. law); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil
Workers International Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) (§ 301 only
gives jurisdiction to federal courts).
9. E.g., Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. International Brotherhood of
Paper Makers, 191 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 933 (1952);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist., 91 F. Supp. 596, 614 (W.D.
Wash. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
821 (1951).
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the Taft-Hartley Act substantiates this theory,10 it is indecisive and
fails to rule out the possibility of federal substantive rights arising
under the Taft-Hartley Act. However, while this interpretation would
be an extension of federal courts jurisdiction over a state-created
right in a non-diversity case, 1 it involves no serious question of
12
constitutionality.
If Congress' purpose in enacting §301 was not only to create a federal
forum but also to direct the federal courts to develop a federal
labor common law, then federal substantive rights are implicit in the
terms of the section. The majority of the courts which have dealt
with the problem have adopted this construction, that Congress created
both a substantive right and a procedure for its enforcement, 3 and
have upheld § 301 under the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. 14 Judge Wyzanski criticizes this interpretation because it
vastly extends the reach of federal law without adequate Congressional
expression of such an intention.15 This is literally true, but after a consideration of the Majority Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare' 6 and the numerous declarations of purpose and policy,17
10. While Senator Taft failed to make a determinative statement in his

Majority Report, SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 et seq. (1947),
Senator Thomas speaking for the minority stated, "Every district court would

still be required to look to State substantive law to determine the question
of violation. This section [301] does not, therefore, create a new cause of
action but merely makes the existing remedy available to more persons.
PART 2, id., at 13.
11. See 6 VA-D.L. REv. 401 (1953).
12. See instant case, 113 F. Supp. at 140 (a discussion of the constitutionality
of this viewpoint). Also see Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158, 164 (9th Cir. 1950). See Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 114,
118 et. seq. (1948); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948).
* 13. It seems probable that federal substantive rights may be distilled by
implication from the grant of jurisdiction. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630, 635 (1948).
See also note 15 infra.
14. Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 83 F. Supp.
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (§ 301 must create federal substantive right for elsewise
it creates a remedy and a forum without creating a right); Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co. v. International Union U.F.W., 76 F. Supp. 493 (D. Md.), af'd,
168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) (Taft-Hartley creates important substantive rights
and § 301 (a) authorizes their enforcement); see Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158, 164 (9th Cir. 1950)
(§ 301 creates a new federal substantive right); Shirley-Herman Co. v.
International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1950). See Cox,
supra note 7, at 304 (close relationship of § 301 and NLRA is sufficient to make
case one arising under laws of United States); Forrester, supra note 12 at
128-31; Note, Section 301(A) of Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutional Problem
of Federal Jurisdiction,57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948); Note, 17 A.L.R.2d 614, 615
(1951).
15. Instant case, 113 F. Supp. at 140. Section 301 is jurisdictional in its
terms and there is no satisfactory declaration in the legislative history of
Taft-Hartley Act to clearly show whether Congress intended anything further.
Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630, 633-34 (1948); see note 10 supra.
16. "The Congress has protected the right of workers to organize. It has
passed laws to encourage and promote collective bargaining.
"Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding, and
enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher
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the majority holding seems to be a very defensible interpretation.
Having legislated under its commerce clause powers, Congress can, as
a matter of federal concern, extend its special federal question jurisdiction to protect federally created rights. 8
Although the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the conflicting
decisions on this point, the instant case does not require such a determination; for here, under either state or federal law, the contract to
arbitrate is valid and creates rights in the parties. The holding of
the instant case, that "Congress ... would have preferred"'19 that the
remedies (inter alia specific performance of arbitration contracts),
irrespective of the rights, should be made uniformly available under
§ 301 without regard to state law, has several implications. Vile the
enforcement of the agreement may be a matter of remedy governed by
the procedure in the federal forum, 20 this alone would obviously not be
sufficient for the decision because traditionally the federal courts
degree of responsibility . . . and will thereby promote industrial peace.'
SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
17. One of the declared purposes of the Federal Mediation Service is to
"exert every reasonable effort to make and, maintain agreements. . . ." 61
STAT. 154, 29 U.S.C.A. § 174(a) (1) (Supp. 1952). "Indeed, the Board has
frequently stated that the stability of labor relations which the statute seeks to

accomplish through the encouragement of the collective bargaining process
ultimately depends upon the channelization of the collective bargaining relationship within the procedures of a collective bargaining agreement. By
encouraging the utilization of such procedures . . . we believe that statutory
policy will best be effectuated." Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753, 754
(1951). See Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 83
F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also, Katz and Jaffe, Enforcing Labor.
ArbitrationClauses by Section 301, Taft-Hartley Act, 8 ARB. J. 80, 83 (1953).
18. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action..-.'
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting,
trade .... ." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (1950). "[Flederal question jurisdiction . . .
was intended to make the federal judicial power 'coextensive' in the legislative." Forrester, supra note 12, at 118.
19. Instant case, 113 F. Supp. at 141.
20. Section 301 created a remedy where none existed before and provided a*
forum (federal) in which to enforce that remedy. Shirley-Herman Co., V.
International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950). Labor organizations should be subject to the same judicial remedies and proceedinhs"ts'
all other citizens. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947). Generally
the state courts on questions of conflict of laws or concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts have held arbitration to be a matter of procedure controlled by the forum. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 44Sup. Ct. 274, 68 L. Ed. 582 (1924) (in personam concurrent jurisdiction with
Admiralty, state court applies the state remedy of specific performance .ofarbitration contract); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926) (New
York statute pertaining to enforcement of arbitration contract affects the
remedies in state courts only); Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.R.R., 211 NY.346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914) (Arbitration contract relates to law of remedies, and
the law of forum governs); Gregory and Orlikoff, supra note 4, at 257. Federal
courts have held that arbitration contracts relate to remedies which are
governed by procedure of the forum. Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui &
Co., 146 F. 2d 381 (2d Cir. (1944) (under Federal Arbitration Act); Boston
& Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street & Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees, 106 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1952) (provisions for enforcement of arbitration contract are exclusively remedial, governed solely by the
law of the forum).
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have denied the remedy of specific performance of an executory arbitration contract. 2' The court must have further concluded that § 301
established a substantive right of specific performance of arbitration
contracts in the federal courts. This reasoning is the sine qua non of
the remedy granted.
The result here may be justified by a finding that § 301 expresses
Congress' intent to afford collective bargaining agreements a maximum
degree of enforceability.2 The obvious utility of arbitration clauses
should cause other federal courts to abandon their traditional view.
Since the words of the statute are ambiguous, however, Congress or
the Supreme Court should act to clarify the existing confusion.
MILITARY LAW- DISCHARGED PERSONNELPOWER TO ARREST FOR SERIOUS CRIMES
Petitioner, an honorably discharged veteran, was arrested in Pittsburgh by military authorities and flown back to Korea to stand trial
for murder. The arrest was made under the purported authority of
Article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,' which provides
that one who commits an offense against the code punishable by imprisonment for five years or more and who cannot be tried in a federal
or state court, shall remain amenable to trial by court-martial. A
habeas corpus petition was filed before the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Held, petition granted. There was
no authority in the military to arrest a civilian inasmuch as no arrest
machinery was provided in Article 3 (a) by which the rights of the
accused would be protected. The military authorities had no more
power of arrest than a private citizen, who would be required by Rule
5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to take the accused immediately before the nearest United States Commissioner for preliminary hearing. Toth v. Talbot, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1953). On
return to the writ of habeas corpus, held, writ sustained and petitioner
discharged. Petitioner, as a civilian, was not subject to the authority
21. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, No. 14,065 C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (Justice Story declined to compel specific performance of the arbitration agreement); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (held arbitration agreement
void in federal forum for it would oust court of its jurisdiction); see Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120, 44 Sup. Ct. 274, 68 L. Ed.
582 (1924) (federal courts have denied, both in equity and at law, the enforcement of executory arbitration agreements); Latter v. Holsom Bread Co.,
108 Utah 364, 375, 160 P.2d 421, 426 (1945) (concurring opinion) (pointing out
federal courts criticism of this judicial hostility). But compare, Gregory and
Orlikoff, supra note 4, at 259 (federal enforcement of arbitration agreements
under Federal Arbitration Act).
22. Instant case, 113 F. Supp. at 142. Also see Latter v. Holsom Bread Co.,
108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421, 426 (1948) (concurring opinion).
1. 64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 553 (a) (1951).
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of any commanding officer who could, under Article 9 (c) 2 of the
Uniform Code, order him into "arrest". Furthermore, Congress did
not give authority to the military to transport the accused to so distant
a point as Korea. Toth v. Talbot, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
In drafting the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress was
particularly interested in retaining for military courts-martial jurisdiction over serious offenses committed by personnel who were discharged before discovery of the crime and who would go free in the
absence of an assumption of jurisdiction by federal or state courts.3
The Committee on Armed Services felt that some method was needed
to retain jurisdiction, but that it should be limited to those offenses of
a more serious nature; 4 Article 3(a) was designed to serve this
function.5

In finding that no machinery or authority to arrest discharged
servicemen exists, the court ignored the intent of the legislature and
of Article 7 (b) of the Uniform Code,6 which expressly sets forth the
power of arrest and includes as subject to the code all those persons
subject to trial thereunder. A fundamental rule of statutory construction provides that the court shall use all possible means to give effect
to the intention and purpose of the legislature unless the statute is in
conflict with the Constitution or organic law.7 In effect, the instant
2. 64 STAT. 111 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 563 (1951).
3. H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949). In U.S. ex rel. Hirshberg
v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 69 Sup. Ct. 530, 93 L. Ed. 621 (1949), it was held that a
court-martial had no jurisdiction over a serviceman who had been discharged
and who had re-enlisted the next day and had been arrested on a charge of
mistreating fellow prisoners in a Japanese prison camp during the prior enlistment. In Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948), a WAC officer
on terminal leave nearly escaped jurisdiction of a court-martial, but was held
only on the ground that the terminal leave status was enough to allow a retention of jurisdiction. The Committee on Armed Services discussed these two,
cases and considered the fact that both defendants would have remained at
large had they been totally and honorably discharged before discovery of the
crime. See Hearings before Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 2498, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 617, 800, 880, 882 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 491, supra.
4. H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 3, at 11.
5. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1262. It is interesting to note, however, that
Maj. Gen. Green, Judge Advocate General of the Army, proposed to the Senate
Committee on Armed Services that jurisdiction over such offenses as the one
in question here be granted expressly to the federal district courts to prevent
adverse criticism of the military for usurping too much civilian power. Hearings before Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 256 (1949). See also Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment,
35 GEO. L.J. 303 (1947), for a discussion of situations in which criminals
escape punishment and remedies therefor.
6. "Any person authorized under regulations governing the armed forces
to apprehend persons subject to this chapter or to trial thereunder may do so
upon reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the person
apprehended committed it." 64 STAT. 111 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 561(b) (1951).
7. See, e.g., United States v. N. E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50,
62 Sup. Ct. 445, 86 L. Ed. 671 (1942); Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S.
204, 52 Sup. Ct. 322, 76 L. Ed. 704 (1932); Ex parte Public Nat. Bank of New
York, 278 U.S. 101, 49 Sup. Ct. 43, 73 L. Ed. 202 (1928); Washington Market Co.
v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 25 L. Ed. 782 (1879). For a further collection of
cases on this point see 82 C.J.S., Statutes 561 n.25 (1953).
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case deprives Article 3 (a) of all force and renders it a nullity. Inasmuch as Article 3 (a) provides that discharged personnel shall not
be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial, the power to
arrest petitioner could easily be found in the Uniform Code. Furthermore, as a rule of construction, statutes which are in pari materia
and relate to the same person or thing should be read together as constituting one law. 8 Here Article 7 (b) and Article 3 (a) read together
give the necessary statutory power to the military to arrest discharged
personnel.
Of course Article 9 (c) could be interpreted so as to nullify Article
3 (a) and render it futile, but this would be to ignore section (e) of
that same Article 9, which provides that nothing in the Article should
be construed to limit the authority to apprehend offenders to secure
their custody until the proper officials are notified. If the "apprehension" is interpreted to mean arrest in the popular sense, then, of
course, Article 3 (a) becomes useless here. But it is obvious that
9carrest" in Article 9 does not mean apprehension because of the provision in Article 9 (e) and the fact that 9 (a) defines arrest as the
restraint of a person by an order directing him to remain within certain limits. Thus it would be consistent and reasonable to conclude
that after the accused has been apprehended under authority of Article 7 (b), he then comes under the authority of the commander who
ordered the apprehension, and it is this commander who can order
his arrest and confinement under Article 9 until time for the courtmartial. Once it is established that the accused is subject to the Code,
his removal to Korea is of no significance because there are no territorial restrictions on-the power of the courts-martial. 9
Article of War 94,10 superseded and repealed by the passage of the
Uniform Code, is an example of a workable law which does in one
statute what Article 3(a) and Article 7(b) accomplish together,
namely retain jurisdiction over discharged personnel (in this case
those who have committed certain frauds against the government)
and provide for the arrest of these offenders. United States ex rel
Marino v. Hildreth" is an example of the retention of jurisdiction and
the exercise thereof under Article of War 94. In that case petitioner
had been arrested in New Jersey by military authorities but was tried,
convicted and imprisoned in New York. The petition for habeas
corpus was denied because of the statutory authorization of Article
8. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 61 Sup. Ct. 102, 85 L. Ed. 40
(1940); White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 59 Sup. Ct. 179, 83 L. Ed. 172
(1938); Hayes v. Hunter, 83 F. Supp. 940 (D.C. Kan. 1948). In this latter case
the court held that Article of War 11 and Article of War 17 should be construed
together in determining the necessary qualifications for defense counsel in a
court-martial trial.
9. Art. 5, UCMJ, 64 STAT. 110 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 555 (1951).
10. 41 STAT. 805 (1920).
11. 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
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of War 94. In Kronberg v. White12 plaintiff was arrested under authority of Article of War 94. On his subsequent release he brought
suit against the responsible military authorities for false arrest and
false imprisonment. In granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court held that the arrest and detention under Article of
3
War 94 were valid and refused to declare the Article unconstitutional.1
Thus the machinery to arrest and try a discharged serviceman for
a serious offense committed while in the service is present in the Uniform Code, and such an arrest has been held valid under similar provisions in Article of War 94. Therefore, it would seem that the decision
in the instant case disregards a pertinent provision of the Code and
applicable judicial precedents. Since the court expressly refrained
from passing on the constitutionality of Article 3 (a) at this stage of
the proceedings, 14 this issue remains unsettled.'5
MILITARY LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATIONADMISSIBILITY OF HANDWRITING SPECIMEN OBTAINED INVOLUNTARILY
Defendant was convicted of forgery in a Navy court-martial. Specimens of his handwriting, involuntarily given before trial, were introduced in evidence over defendant's objection. The Board of Review
held such evidence inadmissible as a violation of the privilege against
self incrimination. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy certified
the question to the Court of Military Appeals. Held, compelling defendant to give a specimen of his handwriting before trial violates the
privilege against self incrimination set forth in Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;' the provision in the Manual for
12. 84 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Kronberg v.
Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 969 (1950).
13. The constitutionality and application of Article of War 94 was also upheld in Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1933), and Ex parte
.oly, 290 Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). In the Joly case the article was upheld primarily because it had been in effect for more than sixty years, but a more
substantial basis was set forth in the Terry case, in which the court said, "[I]n
pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared
the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for
offenses committed while the party is in the military or naval service." Terry
v. United States, supra, at 963. Contra: U.S. ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding
General, Second Service Command, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), in which
Article of War 94 was held unconstitutional. (However, the authority of this
case was questioned in Kronberg v. Hale, supra note 11, on the basis that the
case was reversed on appeal in an unpublished order by stipulation of the
parties.)
14. Instant case, 113 F. Supp. at 330.
15. The decision in the instant case is a protest against petitioner's summarily
being removed from his civilian status and flown to Korea without benefit of
a hearing. This view has much merit and calls for a more adequate definition
of procedural protection of civil rights by the legislature.
1. "(a) No person subject to this code shall compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend
to incriminate him.
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1 2
Courts-Martialto the contrary is invalidated.
United States v. Eggers,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953).
American courts have followed divergent paths3 in the interpretation
of the privilege against self incrimination.4 The overwhelming weight
of authority appears to follow the view of Professor Wigmore in saying that the privilege applies only to "testimonial utterances," that is,
words, written or oral, extracted from a person as a witness by the
use of legal process. 5 Consequently, it is usually held that the privilege
does not prohibit taking fingerprints 6 or footprints;? requiring a person to submit to a physical examination8 or give a specimen of his
body fluid; 9 or requiring a person to exhibit his body or perform acts
for identification purposes in the presence of the jury.10 In these cases
the courts says that the person, usually the accused, is not being compelled to give evidence against himself, but is only compelled to furnish
"real" or "physical" evidence. Further, they reason that since duress
cannot cause the defendant to fabricate or act falsely in these circum-

"(b) No person subject to this code shall interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not
have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or
suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against
him in a trial by court-martial." UCMJ art. 31, 50 U.S.C.A. § 602 (1951).
2. "Also, the prohibition is not violated by requiring a person (including
an accused) to try on clothing or shoes, to place his feet in tracks, to make a
sample of his handwriting,to utter words for the purpose of voice identification,
or to submit to having fingerprints or a sample of his blood taken." MCM 1951,
f1150b. (Italics added)
3. The privilege against self incrimination is usually considered an outgrowth of the infamous English Star Chamber, and the ecclesiastical inquisitions. Early recognition in America law is evidenced by its inclusion in the
constitutions of forty-six of the states and in the Bill of Rights of the Federal
Constitution. For an illuminating discussion of the history of the privilege, see
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MInN. L. REV. 1 (1949);
8 WIGlMoR, EVIDENCE 276 (3d ed. 1940).

4. The American courts usually say that the "main purpose of the provision
was to prohibit the compulsory oral examination of the prisoners before trial,
or upon trial for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them in crime." People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003,
1005, 28 L.R.A. 699 (1894). The courts still seem to follow the test laid down
by Chief Justice Marshall as to what matters are within the protection of the
privilege. He said, "[T]he court ought never to compel a witness to give an
answer which discloses a fact that would form a necessary and essential part
of a crime which is punishable by the laws." 1
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244 (1808). For a discussion of this test, see Falknor, Self-Crimination
Privilege: "Links in the Chain," 5 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1952).
5. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 362 (3d ed. 1940). See also, Comment, To What
Extent Does The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Protect An Accused
From Physical Disclosures?, 1 VAND. L. REV. 243 (1948).
6. See Notes, 16 A.L.R. 370 (1923), 63 A.L.R. 1324 (1929).
7. See Note, 64 A.L.R. 1089 (1929).
8. See Notes, 164 A.L.R. 967-72 (1946), 25 A.L.R.2d 1409 (1952).
9. See Note, 159 A.L.R. 209-16 (1945).
10. See Note 171 A.L.R. 1144-50 (1947). There is a strong split of authority
on this particular point. Wigmore asserts that such matters are not privileged.
8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE 374 (3d ed. 1940). As to compulsory voice exhibition, see
Note, 24 IND. L.J. 587 (1949).
BURR
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stances, such evidence is beyond the scope and purpose of the privilege
and is not entitled to its protection."
It appears to be held universally that a person may refuse to produce
documents or chattels in his possession on the grounds that they
might incriminate him,12 when such production is sought by a subpoena
or other process treating the person as a witness. "[D]ocuments or
chattels obtained from the person's control without the use of process
against him as a witness, are not in the scope of the privilege, and
may be used evidentially....
The Court of Military Appeals is apparently the first American or
English court presented squarely with the question of whether compelling an accused to give 'a specimen of his handwriting falls within
the protection of the privilege. 14 Due to the lack of controlling authorities, the court deduced two possible analogies from the decided
cases. The handwriting specimen could be compared with the fingerprint and footprint cases, and other matters long held to be mere
"physical" evidence, and thereby withdrawn from the protection of
the privilege; or an analogy could be drawn from the cases where
the accused or witness is asked to produce documents or chattels
within his possession, and thereby be brought within the privilege.
The court chose the latter analogy: "Indeed, there is a distinct difference between the present handwriting problem, on the one hand, and
the fingerprint and the foot-in-footprint situations, on the other. The
latter require only passive cooperation, whereas the former requires
active participation and affirmative conduct in the production of an
incriminating document not theretofore in existence."'15
A minority of courts exclude any incriminating evidence obtained
from a person by means of legal process. 16 There has been little dis11. See notes 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 supra.
12. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 Sup. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542, 152
A.L.R. 1202 (1944); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29
L. Ed. 746 (1886); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 363 (3d ed. 1940).
13. 8

WIGMORE,

op. cit. supra note 12, at 364. On compulsory production of

documents, see Notes 120 A.L.R. 1102 (1939), 110 A.L.R. 101 (1937), 103
A.L.R. 522 (1936). See also Comment, To What Extent Does The Privilege
Against Seli-Incrmination Protect a Witness Against Forced Production of
Documents?, 1 VAND. L. REV. 626 (1948).
14. The problem has arisen in Texas and, although the result was in accord
with the instant case, it was based on the peculiar state confessions statute.
Kennison v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154, 260 S.W. 174 (1925), 3 TEXAs L. REV.
485. As the instant opinion indicates, the only remaining decision on the point
was rendered by the Supreme Court of The Philippine Islands. Beltran v.
Samson and Jose, 53 Philippine 570 (1929) (trial judge could not compel a defendant charged with forgery to execute a specimen of his handwriting). The

court there condemned such a practice also, and reaffirmed this position in a
subsequent decision. Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Philippine 483 (1937) (defendant

could not be compelled to give a specimen of her handwriting although she
had denied under oath that she had written the document in question).
15. Instant case, 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 198.
16. E.g., Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So.2d 546 (1946) (defendant could
not be compelled to stand up before the jury for identification purposes). See
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pute among the courts as to admissibility where the specimen of
handwriting was given voluntarily by the defendant, as there is no
compulsion by legal process in obtaining the evidence.' 7 As the only
compulsion used in obtaining the handwriting in the instant case was
the order of the investigating officer, this would seem to fall short of
the legal process spoken of by the civilian authorities. However, an
accused under UCMJ must be informed of his privilege from the
moment of his arrest- a benefit his civilian brother can only obtain
upon trial. 8 It would be possible to interpret this as an indication
that any compulsion between arrest and trial by the authorities is
sufficient; if so, the analogy is sound.
As the Manual for Courts-Martialallowe'd such evidence, 19 it would
have been possible for the court to hold that the handwriting was mere
physical evidence and not within the scope of the privilege. In so
doing, it would have had the support of one leading text writer who
has stated emphatically: "A specimen of handwriting, obtained for
purposes of comparison with a questioned document, can logically be
considered as nothing more than mere physical evidence. It differs
very little, in principle, from a fingerprint impression secured by compulsion for purposes of comparison with a fingerprint found at the
scene of a crime." 20 Further, such a holding would have given effect
to the settled rule of construction that the related provisions of UCMJ
and Manualfor Courts-Martial"should, if possible, be so construed that
effect is given to every provision of each ... so that no part will be
2 1inoperative, superfluous, void or ineffective.
The decision reached by the court, however, is in keeping with its
previous liberal interpretations of the privilege in favor of the accused,2 and appears to be logically sound. The compulsion of such
also, State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948), 24 IND. L.J. 587 (defendant could not be compelled to exhibit his voice).
17. People v. Molineux, 169 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A. 193 (1901);
State v. Scott, 63 Ore. 444, 128 Pac. 441 (1912); Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 81
Va. 374 (1886). The English courts appear to be in accord. Rex v. Voisin,
[1918] 1 K.B. 531, 1 A.L.R. 1298. The courts further allow the introduction of
such a specimen for the purpose of impeaching the testimony given by the
defendant on direct examination. United States v. Mullaney, 32 Fed. 370
(8th Cir. 1887); Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157, 43 Pac. 1013 (1896). But see,
Bermudez v. Castillo, supra note 15. By taldng the witness chair and testifying
in his own behalf, the accused is held to have waived the application of the
privilege.
18. Instant case, 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 195. One of the peculiarities of the privilege
under the military law is that the Court of Military Appeals has termed it a
part of "military due process." It differs from civilian law in this respect. On
the subject, see Wurfel, "Military Due Process": What Is It?, 6 VAND.L. REv.
251 (1953).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. INBAU, SELF INcRnVmEATIoiq 46 (1950).

21. United States v. Lucas, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22 (U.S.C.M.A. 1951).
22. E.g., United States v. Rosato, 11 C.M.R. 143 (U.S.C.M.A. 1953) (fact
situation substantially similar to instant case); United States v. Burton, 7
C.M.R. 848 (Bo. Rev. 1953); United States v. Bellucci, 2 C.M.R. 379 (Bo. Rev.
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specimens is hardly distinguishable from asking the accused, "What
are the characteristics of your handwriting?" Where evidence of his
signature is essential to the establishment of his guilt, as in the instant
case, it seems difficult to maintain that he is not thereby being compelled to make "testimonial utterances" against himself. It is submitted that the court was correct in holding that the result should
not be different where the defendant is forced to give the same evidence by writing.

TORTS - AUTOMOBILE GUEST - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Two girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, were injured while riding as
gratuitous guests of thirteen year old defendant, who was known by
them to be an incompetent, reckless and unlicensed driver. Immediately before the accident took place the defendant had been driving
110 miles per hour which speed the girls had protested. Plaintiffs
brought suit on behalf of the minors under the Texas "guest statute"'
against defendant and his father, owner of the car. The jury returned
a verdict for plaintiffs. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding
that plaintiffs were barred from recovery as a matter of law. Held,
affirmed. The minor girls were contributorily negligent as a matter
of law in riding with a person known to be an incompetent, reckless
and unlicensed driver, and such contributory negligence was the proximate cause of injury. Sargent v. Williams, 258 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.
1953).
The gratuitous automobile guest has often been denied recovery as
a matter of law where it has been found that "reasonable men could
not differ" as to his contributory negligence.2 Although each case is
said to depend on its own particular facts, 3 directed verdicts have
usually been given in those cases in which the guest entered the car
with knowledge that the driver was too intoxicated to drive carefully;4 the guest failed to disembark upon reasonable opportunity; 5
1952); United States v. Phillips, 8 C.M.R. 519 (Bo. Rev. 1952); United States
v. Thacker, 4 C.M.R. 432 (Bo. Rev. 1952); United States v. Walls, 3 C.M.R. 402
(Bo. Rev. 1952); United States v. Mardiss, 1 C.M.R. 283 (Bo. Rev. 1951);
United States v. Bowles, 1 C.M.R. 474 (Bo. Rev. 1951). It is believed that the
above cited cases are all that have been decided on the privilege since the
adoption of UCMJ.
1. The guest may recover from the owner or operator only if "such accident
shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator, or caused
by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others." TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 6701b, § 1 (1948).
2. Hirsch v. D'Autremont, 133 Cal. App. 106, 23 P.2d 1066 (1933).
3. Edenton v. McKelvey, 186 Tenn. 655, 212 S.W.2d 616 (1948).
4. Irby v. Williams, 313 Ky. 353, 231 S.W.2d 1 (1950); Elba v. Thomas, 59
So.2d 732 (La. App. 1952); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So.2d 646 (1947);
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or the guest failed to protest the driver's obviously dangerous conduct. 6
The rule laid down in these cases is that the guest is contributorily
negligent in voluntarily exposing himself to the risk of the known
incompetence, recklessness or intoxication of the driver.
The defense relied on in the guest cases is usually contributory negligence 7 or assumption of risk,8 but in some instances both defenses are
said to be available. 9 In some of the early cases arising under the
guest statutes, wherein the plaintiff was required to prove gross, willful or wanton misconduct, it was indicated that ordinary contributory
negligence was no defense. 10 Today, however, it is generally held that
either ordinary contributory negligence or assumption of risk will bar
the guest's recovery." It is doubtful whether the distinction between
the two will be maintained in the modern guest cases, since the courts
2
use the terms interchangeably.
In cases in which the guest has made a timely protest of the dangerous conduct of the driver, the question of contributory negligence
has heretofore been left to the jury, even though the guest knew upon
entering the car that his host had consumed some intoxicants or was
habitually reckless. 13 In such cases it has been said that the guest
Hicks v. Herbert, 173 Tenn. 1, 113 S.W.2d 1197 (1938).
collected in Note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1951).

See generally cases

5. Hirsch v. D'Autremont, 133 Cal. App. 106, 23 P.2d 1066 (1933); Bogen v.

Bogen, 220 N.C. 648, 18 S.E.2d 162 (1942); Schiller v. Rice, 246 S.W.2d 607

(Tex. 1952); Young v. Wheby, 126 W. Va. 741, 30 S.E.2d 6 (1944).
6. Irby v. Williams, 313 Ky. 353, 231 S.W.2d 1 (1950) (drunken driving);
Haugen v. Wittkopf, 242 Wis. 276, 7 N.W.2d 886 (1943) (failure to keep a
proper lookout). Contra: Ling v. Pease, 123 Colo. 518, 232 P.2d 189 (1951)
(speeding toward dead-end street).
7. Hirsch v. D'Autremont, 133 Cal. App. 106, 23 P.2d 1066 (1933); Irby v.
Williams, 313 Ky. 353, 231 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
8. Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So.2d 646 (1947); Bourestrom v.
Bourestrom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939).
9. Mountain v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. App.2d 333, 234 P.2d 1031 (1951); Zullo
v. Zullo, 138 Conn. 712, 89 A.2d 216 (1952); Elba v. Thomas, 59 So.2d 732 (La.
App. 1952). See PROSSER, TORTS 378-79 (1941).
10. See Freedman v. Hurwitz, 116 Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647 (1933); Aycock v.
Green, 94 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
11. Mountain v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. App.2d 333, 234 P.2d 1031 (1951); Henley
v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953); Schiller v. Rice, 246 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.
1952). See Note, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 76 (1949).
12. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Salter, 114 Colo. 513, 167 P.2d
954 (1946), 19 RocKy MT. L. REv. 91; Elba v. Thomas, 59 So.2d 732 (La. App.
1952). In Schubring v. Weggen, 234 Wis. 517, 291 N.W. 788, 791 (1940), after
applying the defense of assumption of risk, the court said: "[B]ut the thing
is the same whether it be called the one thing or the other and it should be
given the same effect." In Schiller v. Rice, 246 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. 1952),
after expressly denying the application of the defense of assumption of risk,
the court said: "Even so, our courts have recognized that a recovery by a
plaintiff may be barred by such.doctrines as 'voluntary exposure to risk,' ...
or that known as volenti non fit injuria... which doctrines, if distinguishable
from the doctrine of assumed risk, are nevertheless closely akin thereto."
13. Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 5 Cal.2d 480, 55 P.2d 870
(1936) (host drinking); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Salter, 114 Colo.
513, 167 P.2d 954 (1946); Davis v. Hollowell, 326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W.2d 641
(1950) (host drinking, speeding, driving recklessly); Petersen v. Abrams, 188
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does not, by riding with a known incompetent, submit to the driver's
gross misconduct. 14 Also, where the plaintiff was under the increased
burden of a guest statute, the courts usually have not taken the case
15
from the jury.
In view of these considerations, it would seem that the present decision represents an unprecedented ruling that the gratuitous guest
is barred from recovery as a matter of law merely because he accepts
a ride with an incompetent, reckless driver. The desirability of thus
invading the province of the jury who have had a chance to see and
hear the witnesses is doubtful, particularly where the guests are as
young as these. Two states have constitutional provisions forbidding
such a practice. 16 In the absence of a clearly defined policy to the contrary, it would seem more desirable to leave the question of the guest's
contributory negligence to the jury.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -EMPLOYEES'
ALTERCATIONS
AGGRESSOR'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION

-

Decedent was accused by a fellow employee of stealing bread baskets
from their employer's truck. The accusation was made in the absence
of decedent, but was communicated to him. Two days later on the
employer's premises, at the first meeting subsequent to the accusation,
the decedent assaulted his fellow worker, and in the ensuing altercatior suffered a heart attack. In an action brought under the Workmen's
Compensation Act the Industrial Commission awarded compensation.
Employer brought certiorari. Held, affirmed. Where an injury results
from a work-connected fight the injured party will be compensated
even though he is the aggressor, as the legislature has not made aggression a defense to recovery. Petro v. Martin Baking Co., 58 N.W.2d
731 (Minn. 1953).
Workmen's Compensation statutes generally deny recovery to participants in an altercation which is based upon personal animosity
as distinguished from those assaults arising out of and in the course of
Ore. 518, 216 P.2d 664 (1950). But cf. Akins v. Hemphill, 33 Wash.2d 735, 207
P.2d 195 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REV. 149 (an invited guest cannot terminate the
host-guest relationship merely by making protest); Taylor v. Taug, 17 Wash.2d
533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943) (insufficient protest). It is important to note, however, that the Washington statute precludes recovery "unless the accident shall
have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator... ." WASH. REv.
CODE § 46.08.080 (1951).
14. Davis v. Hollowell, 326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W.2d 641 (1950).
15. Ling v. Pease, 123 Colo. 518, 232 P.2d 189 (1951); Zullo v. Zullo, 138
Conn. 712, 89 A.2d 216 (1952); Henley v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953); Booth

v. General Mills, Inc., 243 Iowa 206, 49 N.W.2d 561 (1951); Davis v. Hollowell,
326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W.2d 641 (1950); Petersen v. Abrams, 188 Ore. 518, 216
P.2d 664 (1950). Contra: Schiller v. Rice, 246 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1952); Taylor
v. Taug, 17 Wash.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
16. ARiz. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 5; OKLA. CONST. Art. XXIII,

§ 6.
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employment.' The majority of American courts in interpreting the
workmen's compensation statutes, have complemented the above rule
by denying compensation when the injuries result from an altercation
in which the claimant is the aggressor; 2 the "aggressor" defense is
entirely a court-imposed one. The majority rule denying recovery
to the aggressor generally has been predicated upon one or more of
three theories: that the fight he has provoked was not for the benefit
of the employer, and hence did not arise out of the employment; 3 that
it was not included within the risks of the employment; 4 or that it
would be contrary to public policy to allow recovery for a man's own
mischief. 5 However, some jurisdictions, though purporting to follow
the majority theory, indirectly circumvent that rule by awarding compensation when the claimant has assaulted a third party whom he
had reason to believe had struck him,6 or when the claimant was induced to hit his fellow worker by vile words which are treated by the
court as the initial aggression.7 The courts, employing similar techniques, have also avoided application of the personal animosity rule.
Thus, depending on whether the statute is broadly or strictly construed, the courts reach opposite results in very similar fact situations. 8
The principle enunciated by the court in the instant case is expressly
opposite to the majority rule concerning aggressors; it is also indirectly
1. Examples of states having this type of defense are: Alabama, ALA.
tit. 26, § 262(j) (1940); Delaware, DEL. REv. Code § 6115(b) (1935);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (1937); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.61 (5b)
CODE

(1946); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952); Texas, Tax. RaV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1941); Wyoming, Wyo. CoMP. STAT. AxN. §,72106(m) (1945). The Minnesota Statute provides that compensation will not
be awarded for "an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him
and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his employment."
M NN. STAT. ANN. § 176.01 (11) (West 1945).
2. Kimbro v. Black & White Cab Co., 50 Ga. App. 143, 177 S.E. 274 (1934);
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E. 781 (1931);
Triangle Auto Painting & Trimming Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 346 Ill. 609, 178
N.E. 886 (1931); Horvath v. La Ford, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W.2d 915 (1943); Brown
v. Philmac Sportswear Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 378, 44 A.2d 805 (Workmen's Comp.
Bureau, Dep't Labor 1945); Merkel v. Gillespie, 10 N.J. Misc. 1081, 162 Atl.
250 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Vollmer v. Milwaukee, 254 Wis. 162, 35 N.W.2d 304
(1948); see also Armour & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 397 Ill. 433, 74 N.E.2d
704 (1947).
3. Vollmer v. Milwaukee, 254 Wis. 162, 35 N.W.2d 304 (1948).
4. Fischer v. Industrial Comm'n, 408 Ill. 115, 96 N.E.2d 478 (1951).
5. Horvath v. La Ford, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W.2d 915 (1943).
6. Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern Son, Inc., 229 N.Y. 192, 128 N.E. 126 (1920).
7. Haas v. Brotherhood of Transp. Workers, 158 Pa. Super. 291, 44 A.2d
776 (1945).
8. On the facts of an attack by a fellow employee for no known reason:
recovery allowed in Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101
So. 248 (1924) (which held that there existed a risk for such an assault); no
recovery allowed in Igler's Casino v. Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill. 330, 68 N.E.2d
773 (1946) (which declared such risk incidental to the general public). On a
similar fact situation involving an attack upon a woman employee due to
jealously of fellow worker: recovery allowed in Katz v. Reissman-Rothman
Corp., 261 App. Div. 862, 24 N.Y.S.2d 807 (3d Dep't 1941); no recovery allowed
in Scholtzhauer v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 233 N.Y. 12, 134 N.E. 701 (1922).
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contrary to the personal animosity theory since it ignores that theory
and awards compensation which might have been denied in many
other jurisdictions. This is illustrated by the fact that the four decisions 9 relied upon by the instant case may be distinguished from
the present facts on the basis that the events inducing the altercation
in the supporting cases were followed immediately by the assault. A
lapse of two days between the inducement and the assault might possibly have caused the dispute to be interpreted as a personal grudge
in many jurisdictions. 0 Since the majority rule has often been ignored
as in the instant case, or has been avoided as illustrated above, it is
well to re-evaluate this rule which purportedly guides the courts.
The rationale of recent decisions and the exceptions stated above
indicate it is time for the courts to phrase their opinions in language
other than that of "aggression." As the purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Acts is to do away with fault as the basis for liability,"
and since the statutes do not specifically exempt aggressors from recovery,' 2 it is difficult to support the majority proposition. The courts
have declared that the injury need not have been inflicted in furtherance of the employer's business to be compensable. 13 Moreover, many
courts have also stated that altercations are within the risks of employment when men are forced to work closely together.14 It is generally
accepted that the Workmen's Compensation Acts should be broadly
and liberally construed in favor of the claimant.15 This suggests the
conclusion that the question of aggression should have no weight in
deciding rights to compensation. 16
9. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Cal., 38 Cal.2d 659,
242 P.2d 311 (1952); Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949); Newell
v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947) (the first case where the aggressor
defense was disallowed); Commissioner of Taxation & Finance v. Bronx Hospital, 276 App. Div. 708, 97 N.Y.S.2d 120 (3d Dep't 1950).
10. Horvath v. La Ford, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W.2d 915 (1943) (twenty minutes
between grievance and assault denied recovery); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Collins, 289 S.W. 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (no recovery allowed when lapse
of two hours separated the work-connected grievance and assault).
11. "It is entirely inconsistent with reading into the statute the law of tort
causation and defense, where liability is predicated on fault and nullified by
contributory fault." Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 17
(D.C. Cir. 1940).
12. "Courts are not justified in making exceptions for 'aggressors' where the
legislature has not done so by express provisions." Horovitz, The Litigious
Phrase: "Arising Out of" Employment, 4 NACCA L.J. 19 at 53 (1949).
13. Justice Cardozo, in allowing recovery to an employee hit in the eye by
an apple thrown in horseplay, states, "The risks of injury incurred in the
crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of fellow workmen are not
measured by the tendency of such acts to serve the master's business. Many
things that have no such tendency are done by workmen every day." Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711, 712 (1920).
14. Hansen v. Frankfort Chair Co., 249 Ky. 194, 60 S.W.2d 349 (1933);
Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101 So. 248 (1924).
15. Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P.2d 119 (1941); Cain v. State Ind.
Acc. Comm'n, 149 Ore. 29, 37 P.2d 353 (1934); Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker,
53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736 (1938).
16. "The difficulty with the defense . . .is that it imposes the necessity of
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The nation-wide liberalizing trend has also affected the criteria
which control in matters of personal animosity. This trend has accounted for the view that statutory exclusion of personal animosity
should be strictly interpreted so as to include only those assaults with
no connection whatever to the employment, work conditions, personal
animosity expected among workers, personal grudges leading from
the employment, or grudges originating from circumstances outside of
employment, but culminating in a work-connected assault. 17 Thus, if
there are concurrent reasons underlying the assault, and one of them
is connected with the employment, recovery should be allowed. The
Minnesota court, in strictly construing the personal animosity rule,
stands as a guide light on which other courts may well focus.
selecting one overt act out of a series of hostile verbal, psychological and
physical acts as the one which, for compensation purposes, caused the quarrel
and elicited the ultimate injury." 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 127 (1952). "It is the character and nature of the assault which
determines whether it arises out of the employment, not the culpability or
lack of culpability or the parties involved. It is the assault itself which arises
out of the employment; and who initiates the altercation has no bearing on
that question.... ." Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV. 311, 347 (1946). "To create an artificial rule
that he whose fist first made contact is an aggressor (and can never recover,
even though the first fist did no harm, whereas the second fist permanently
injured the fellow worker), is to forget the legislative command that injuries
arising out of the employment be compensated ...." Id. at 346.
17. Keyhea v. Woodard-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830 (La. App. 1933)
(difficulty arose from jealously over a woman; compensation allowed to injured claimant); Winter v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 425, 28 A.2d 545
(Workmen's Comp. Bureau, Dep't Labor 1942) (award made despite a long
period of personal animosity culminating in a deliberate attack over methods
of work); Janschewsky v. E. W. Bliss Co., 198 App. Div. 8, 189 N.Y. Supp. 154
(3d Dep't 1921) (compensation awarded to claimant when injured by fellow
employees jealous of his doing superior work); Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co. v. Jordan, 140 Okla. 238, 283 Pac. 240 (1929) (award made to injured
employee although personal animosity existed before they were employed to
work together).

